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Background: Previous lesion, electrical self-stimulation and drug addiction studies suggest that the midbrain 
dopamine systems are parts of the reward system of the brain. This review provides an updated overview about the 
basic signals of dopamine neurons to environmental stimuli.
Methods: The described experiments used standard behavioral and neurophysiological methods to record the activity 
of single dopamine neurons in awake monkeys during specific behavioral tasks.
Results: Dopamine neurons show phasic activations to external stimuli. The signal reflects reward, physical salience, 
risk and punishment, in descending order of fractions of responding neurons. Expected reward value is a key decision 
variable for economic choices. The reward response codes reward value, probability and their summed product, 
expected value. The neurons code reward value as it differs from prediction, thus fulfilling the basic requirement for a 
bidirectional prediction error teaching signal postulated by learning theory. This response is scaled in units of standard 
deviation. By contrast, relatively few dopamine neurons show the phasic activation following punishers and 
conditioned aversive stimuli, suggesting a lack of relationship of the reward response to general attention and arousal. 
Large proportions of dopamine neurons are also activated by intense, physically salient stimuli. This response is 
enhanced when the stimuli are novel; it appears to be distinct from the reward value signal. Dopamine neurons show 
also unspecific activations to non-rewarding stimuli that are possibly due to generalization by similar stimuli and 
pseudoconditioning by primary rewards. These activations are shorter than reward responses and are often followed 
by depression of activity. A separate, slower dopamine signal informs about risk, another important decision variable. 
The prediction error response occurs only with reward; it is scaled by the risk of predicted reward.
Conclusions: Neurophysiological studies reveal phasic dopamine signals that transmit information related 
predominantly but not exclusively to reward. Although not being entirely homogeneous, the dopamine signal is more 
restricted and stereotyped than neuronal activity in most other brain structures involved in goal directed behavior.
Background
Results from lesion and psychopharmacological studies
suggest a wide range of behavioral functions for midbrain
dopamine systems. The key question is, which of these
many functions are actively encoded by a phasic dop-
amine signal compatible with rapid neuronal mecha-
nisms? Good hints come from drug addiction and
electrical self-stimulation, suggesting that dopamine
activity has rewarding and approach generating effects
[1,2].
We can define rewards as objects or events that gener-
ate approach and consummatory behavior, produce
learning of such behavior, represent positive outcomes of
economic decisions and engage positive emotions and
hedonic feelings. Rewards are crucial for individal and
gene survival and support elementary processes such as
drinking, eating and reproduction. This behavioral defi-
nition attributes reward function also to certain nonali-
mentary and nonsexual entities, including money,
technical artefacts, aesthetic stimulus attributes and
mental events. Rewards engage agents in such diverse
behaviors as foraging and trading on stock markets.
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Basic concepts
Rewards have specific magnitudes and occur with spe-
cific probabilities. Agents aim to optimize choices
between options whose values are determined by the
kind of the choice object and its magnitude and probabil-
ity [3]. Therefore rewards can be adequately described by
probability distributions of reward values. In an ideal
world these distributions follow a Gaussian function,
with extreme rewards occurring less frequently than
intermediate outcomes. Experimental tests often use
binary probability distributions with equiprobable values
(each reward value occurring at p = 0.5). Gaussian and
binary probability distributions are fully described by the
mathematical expected value (first moment of probability
distribution) and the dispersions or deviations of values
from the mean, namely the (expected) variance (second
moment) or (expected) standard deviation (square root of
variance). Variance and standard deviation are often con-
sidered as measures of risk. In behavioral economics, the
term 'risk' refers to a form of uncertainty in which the
probability distribution is known, whereas 'ambiguity'
indicates incomplete knowledge of probabilities and is
often referred to simply as 'uncertainty'. Risk refers to the
chance of winning or losing, rather than the more narrow,
common sense association with loss.
Predictions are of fundamental importance for making
informed decision by providing advance information
about the available choice options, as opposed to guesses
that occur when outcomes are unknown. As reward can
be quantified by probability distributions of value, reward
predictions specify the expected value and (expected)
variance or standard deviation of the distribution.
Evolutionary pressure favors the energy efficient pro-
cessing of information. One potential solution is to store
predictions about future events in higher brain centers
and calculate in lower brain centers the difference
between new environmental information and the stored
prediction. The discrepancy between the actual event and
its prediction is called an event prediction error. Keeping
up with the changing environmental situation by higher
brain centers would simply involve updating the predic-
tions with the less information containing, and less
energy consuming, prediction errors rather than process-
ing the full peripheral information every time one little
thing has changed [4]. In this way higher brain centers
have access to the full information about the external
world for perceptions, decisions and behavioral reactions
at a much lower energy cost. This fundamental property
of predictions leads to the observable phenomenon of
learning, as defined by changes in behavior based on
updated predictions.
Animal learning theory and efficient temporal differ-
ence reinforcement models postulate that outcome pre-
diction errors are crucial for Pavlovian and operant
conditioning [5,6]. Current views conceptualize Pavlov-
ian learning as any form of acquisition of prediction that
leads to altered vegetative reactions or striated muscle
contractions, as long as the outcome is not conditional on
the behavioral reaction. Thus, Pavlovian reward predic-
tions convey information not only about the reward value
(expected value) but also about the risk (variance) of
future rewards, which constitutes an important extension
of the concept proposed by Pavlov a hundred years ago.
The importance of prediction errors is based on Kamin's
blocking effect [7] which demonstrates that learning and
extinction advance only to the extent at which a rein-
forcer is better or worse than predicted; learning slows
progressively as the prediction approaches asymptotically
the value of the reinforcer.
Dopamine response to reward reception
The majority of midbrain dopamine neurons (75-80%)
show rather stereotyped, phasic activations with latencies
of <100 ms and durations of <200 ms following tempo-
rally unpredicted food and liquid rewards (Figure 1A).
This burst response depends on the activation and plas-
ticity of glutamatergic NMDA and AMPA receptors
located on dopamine neurons [8-12]. The burst is critical
for behavioral learning of appetitive tasks such as condi-
tioned place preference and T-maze choices for food or
cocaine reward and for conditioned fear responses [9].
Reward prediction error coding
The dopamine response to reward delivery appears to
code a prediction error; a reward that is better than pre-
dicted elicits an activation (positive prediction error), a
fully predicted reward draws no response, and a reward
that is worse than predicted induces a depression (nega-
tive error) [13-24]. Thus the dopamine response imple-
ments fully the crucial term of the Rescorla-Wagner
learning model and resembles closely the teaching signal
of efficient temporal difference reinforcement learning
models [6,23].
The error response varies quantitatively with the differ-
ence between the received reward value and the expected
reward value [18-23]. The prediction error response is
sensitive to the time of the reward; a delayed reward
induces a depression at its original time and an activation
at its new time [24,25]. The quantitative error coding is
evident for activations reflecting positive prediction
errors. By contrast, the depression occurring with nega-
tive prediction errors shows naturally a narrower
dynamic range, as neuronal activity cannot fall below
zero, and appropriate quantitative assessment requires to
take the full period of depression into account [26].
Thus, dopamine neurons respond to reward only to the
extent to which it differs from prediction. As prediction
originates from previously experienced reward, dop-
amine neurons are activated only when the currentSchultz Behavioral and Brain Functions 2010, 6:24
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reward is better than the previous reward. The same
reward over again will not activate dopamine neurons. If
the activation of dopamine neurons has a positively rein-
forcing effect on behaviour, only increasing rewards will
provide continuing reinforcement via dopaminergic
mechanisms. This may be one reason why constant,
unchanging rewards seem to lose their stimulating influ-
ence, and why we always need more reward.
Stringent tests for reward prediction error coding
Animal learning theory has developed formal paradigms
for testing reward prediction errors. In the blocking test
[7], a stimulus that is paired with a fully predicted reward
cannot be learned and thus does not become a valid
reward predictor. The absence of a reward following the
blocked stimulus does not constitute a prediction error
and does not lead to a response in dopamine neurons,
even after extensive stimulus-reward pairing [27]. By
contrast, the delivery of a reward after a blocked stimulus
constitutes a positive prediction error and accordingly
elicits a dopamine activation.
The conditioned inhibition paradigm [28] offers an
additional test for prediction errors. In the task employed
in our experiments, a test stimulus is presented simulta-
neously with an established reward predicting stimulus
but no reward is given after the compound, making the
test stimulus a predictor for the absence of reward.
Reward omission after such a conditioned inhibitor does
not constitute a negative prediction error and accordingly
fails to induce a depression in dopamine neurons [29]. By
contrast, delivery of a reward after the inhibitor produces
a strong positive prediction error and accordingly a
strong dopamine activation.
Figure 1 Phasic activations of neurophysiological impulse activity of dopamine neurons. A: Phasic activations following primary rewards. B: 
Phasic activations following conditioned, reward predicting stimuli. C: Top: Lack of phasic activation following primary aversive air puff. Bottom: sub-
stantial activating population response following conditioned aversive stimuli when stimulus generalization by appetitive stimuli is not ruled out; 
grey: population response to conditioned visual aversive stimulus when appetitive stimulus is also visual; black: lack of population response to condi-
tioned visual aversive stimulus when appetitive stimulus is auditory. D: Phasic activations following physically intense stimuli. These activations are 
modulated by the novelty of the stimuli but do not occur to novelty per se. E: Left: Shorter and smaller activations followed frequently by depressions 
induced by unrewarded control stimuli (black) compared to responses following reward predicting stimuli (grey). Right: Activations to delay predict-
ing stimuli show initial, poorly graded activation component (left of line) and subsequent, graded value component inversely reflecting increasing 
delays (curves from top to bottom). Time scale (500 ms) applies to all panels A-E. Data from previous work [29,31-33,43,59].Schultz Behavioral and Brain Functions 2010, 6:24
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The results from these two formal tests confirm that
dopamine neurons show bidirectional coding of reward
prediction errors.
Adaptive reward prediction error coding
In a general sense, a reward predicting stimulus specifies
the value of future rewards by informing about the proba-
bility distribution of reward values. Thus, the stimulus
indicates the expected value (first moment) and
(expected) variance (second moment) or standard devia-
tion of the distribution.
The dopamine value prediction error response is sensi-
tive to both the first and second moments of the pre-
dicted reward distribution at two seconds after the
stimulus. In an experiment, different visual stimuli can
predicted specific binary probability distributions of
equiprobable reward magnitudes with different expected
values and variances. As the prediction error response
reflects the difference between the obtained and expected
reward value, the identical magnitude of the received
reward produces either an increase or decrease of dop-
amine activity depending on whether that reward is
larger or smaller than its prediction, respectively [23].
This result suggests that value prediction error coding
provides information relative to a reference or anchor
value.
The dopamine coding of reward value prediction error
adapts to the variance or standard deviation of the distri-
bution. In a binary distribution of equiprobable rewards,
the delivery of reward with the larger magnitude within
each distribution elicits the same dopamine activation
with each distribution, despite 10 fold differences
between the obtained reward magnitudes (and the result-
ing value prediction errors) [23]. Numerical calculations
reveal that the dopamine response codes the value pre-
diction error divided by the standard deviation of the pre-
dicted distribution. This amounted to an effective
normalization or scaling of the value prediction error
response in terms of standard deviation, indicating how
much the obtained reward value differs from the
expected value in units of standard deviation. Theoretical
considerations suggest that error teaching signals that are
s c a l e d  b y  v a r i a n c e  o r  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n
mean can mediate stable learning that is resistant to the
predicted risk of outcomes [30].
Dopamine response to reward predicting stimuli
Dopamine neurons show activations ('excitations') fol-
lowing reward predicting visual, auditory and somatosen-
sory stimuli (Figure 1B) [31-33]. The responses occur
irrespectively of the sensory modalities and spatial posi-
tions of the stimuli, and irrespectively of the effectors
being arm, mouth or eye movements. The activations
increase monotonically with reward probability [18] and
reward magnitude, such as liquid volume [23]. However,
the dopamine responses do not distinguish between
reward probability and magnitude as long as the expected
value is identical [23]. Thus the activations appear to code
the expected value of predicted reward probability distri-
butions. Expected value is the more parsimonious expla-
nation, and the noise in the neuronal responses prevents
a characterization in terms of expected (subjective) util-
ity. Note that the temporal discounting described below
reveals subjective coding and might provide some light
on the issue. Response magnitude increases with decreas-
ing behavioral reaction time, indicating that the dop-
amine response is sensitive to the animal's motivation
[19]. In choices between different reward values or
delays, the dopamine responses to the presentation of
choice options reflects the animal's future chosen reward
[34] or the highest possible reward of two available choice
options [35].
During the course of learning, the dopamine activation
to the reward decreases gradually across successive learn-
ing trials, and an activation to the reward predicting stim-
ulus develops at the same time [36,37]. The acquisition of
conditioned responding is sensitive to blocking, indicat-
ing that predicton errors play a role in the acquisition of
dopamine responses to conditioned stimuli [27]. The
response transfer to reward predicting stimuli complies
with the principal characteristics of teaching signals of
efficient temporal difference reinforcement models [38].
The response shift does not involve the backpropagation
of prediction errors across the stimulus-reward interval
of earlier temporal difference models [27,38] but is repro-
duced in the original temporal difference model and in
the original and more recent temporal difference imple-
mentations [6,37,39].
Subjective reward value coding shown by temporal 
discounting
The objective measurement of subjective reward value by
choice preferences reveals that rewards lose some of their
value when they are delayed. In fact, rats, pigeons, mon-
keys and humans often prefer sooner smaller rewards
over later larger rewards [40-42]. Thus, the subjective
value of reward appears to decay with increasing time
delays, even though the physical reward, and thus the
objective reward value, is the same.
Psychometric measures of intertemporal behavioral
choices between sooner and later rewards adjust the
magnitude of the early reward until the occurrence of
choice indifference, defined as the probability of choosing
each option with p = 0.5. Thus, a lower early reward at
choice indifference indicates a lower subjective value of
the later reward. In our recent experiment on monkeys,
choice indifference values for rewards delayed by 4, 8 and
16 s decreased monotonically by about 25%, 50% andSchultz Behavioral and Brain Functions 2010, 6:24
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75%, respectively, compared to a reward after 2 s [43].
The decrease fit a hyperbolic discounting function.
The dopamine responses to reward predicting stimuli
decreases monotonically across reward delays of 2 to 16 s
[25,43], despite the same physical amount of reward
being delivered after each delay. These data suggest that
t e m p o r a l  d e l a y s  a f f e c t  d o p a m i n e  r e s p o n s e s  t o  r e w a r d
predicting stimuli in a similar manner as they affect sub-
jective reward value assessed by intertemporal choices.
Interestingly, the decrease of dopamine response with
reward delay is indistiguishable from the response
decr ease  wit h low e r r ewar d ma gnit u de.  T his  si mi la rit y
suggests that temporal delays affect dopamine responses
via changes in reward value. Thus, for dopamine neurons,
delayed rewards appear as if they were smaller.
Thus, dopamine neurons seem to code the subjective
rather than the physical, objective value of delayed
rewards. Given that utility is a measure for the subjective
rather than objective value of reward, the response
decrease with temporal discounting might suggest that
dopamine neurons code reward as (subjective) utility
rather than as (objective) value. Further experiments
might help to test utility coding more directly.
Dopamine response to aversive stimuli
Aversive stimuli such as air puffs, hypertonic saline and
electric shock induce activating ('excitatory') responses in
a small proportion of dopamine neurons in awake ani-
mals (14% [33]; 18-29% [44]; 23% [45]; 11% [46]), and the
majority of dopamine neurons are either depressed in
their activity or not influenced by aversive events (Figure
1C top). In contrast to rewards, air puffs fail to induce
bidirectional prediction error responses typical for
reward; prediction only modulates aversive activations
[45,46].
Aversive stimulation in anaesthetised animals produces
varying but often low degrees of mostly slower, activating
responses (50% [47]; 18% [48]; 17% [49]; 14% [50]) and
often depressions of activity. Neurophysiological reinves-
tigations with better identification of dopamine neurons
confirmed the overall low incidence of aversive dopamine
activations in anaesthetised animals [51] and located
aversively responding dopamine neurons in the ventro-
medial tegmental area of the midbrain [52].
Conditioned, air puff predicting stimuli in awake mon-
keys elicit activations in the minority of dopamine neu-
rons, and depressions in a larger fraction of dopamine
neurons (11% [33]; 13% [45]; 37% [46]). The depressant
responses cancel out the few activations in averaged pop-
ulation responses of dopamine neurons to aversive stim-
uli [33] (see Figure 1C bottom, black). In one study, the
conditioned aversive stimulus activated more neurons
than the air puff itself (37% vs. 11% [46]), although a con-
ditioned stimulus is less aversive than the primary aver-
sive event it predicts, such as an air puff. The higher
number of activations to the conditioned stimulus com-
pared to the air puff suggests an inverse relationship
between aversiveness and activation (the more aversive
the stimulus the less frequent the activation) or an addi-
tional, non-aversive stimulus component responsible for
increasing the proportion of activated neurons from 11%
to 37%. Although the stimulus activations correlated pos-
itively with air puff probability in the population, they
were not assessed in individual neurons [46]. A popula-
tion correlation may arise from a relatively small number
of positively correlated neurons within that population,
and the truly aversive stimulus activations might be
closer to 11% than 37%. In another study, large propor-
tions of dopamine neurons showed phasic activations to
conditioned aversive stimuli when these were presented
in random alternation with reward predicting stimuli of
the same sensory modality (Figure 1C bottom, grey) (65%
[33]); the activations were much less frequent when the
two types of conditioned stimuli had different sensory
modalities (Figure 1C bottom, black) (11%). The next
chapter will discuss the factors possibly underlying these
unexplained activations to aversive and other, unre-
warded stimuli.
Although some dopamine neurons are activated by
aversive events, the largest dopamine activation is related
to reward. Data obtained with other methods lead to sim-
ilar conclusions. Fast scan voltammetry in behaving rats
shows striatal dopamine release induced by reward and a
shift to reward predicting stimuli after conditioning [53],
suggesting that impulse responses of dopamine neurons
lead to corresponding dopamine release from striatal var-
icosities. The dopamine increase lasts only a few seconds
and thus has the shortest time course of all neurochemi-
cal methods, closest to electrophysiological activation.
The dopamine release is differential for reward (sucrose)
and fails to occur with punishment (quinine) [54]. As vol-
tammetry assesses local averages of dopamine concentra-
tion, the absence of measurable release with quinine
might hide a few activations cancelled by depressions in
the dopamine population response [33]. Studies using
very sensitive in vivo microdialysis detect dopamine
release following aversive stimuli [55]. This response may
reflect a dopamine change induced by the few neurons
activated by aversive stimuli, although the time course of
microdialysis measurements is about 300-500 times
slower than the impulse response and might be sufficient
for allowing presynaptic interactions to influence dop-
amine release [56]. Disruption of burst firing of dopamine
neurons disrupts several appetitive learning tasks but also
fear conditioning [9]. The result could suggest a learning
function of aversive dopamine responses if the unspecific,
generally disabling effect of lower dopamine concentra-
tion is ruled out, which remains to be shown. The specificSchultz Behavioral and Brain Functions 2010, 6:24
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stimulation of dopamine neurons by optogenetic meth-
ods via genetically inserted channelrhodopsin induces
Pavlovian place preference conditioning in mice [57]. By
contrast, a net aversive effect of dopamine stimulation
would have conceivably produced place avoidance learn-
ing. These results confirm the notion of a global positive
reinforcing function of dopamine systems derived from
earlier lesioning, electrical self-stimulation and drug
addiction work [1,2]. However, these arguments postulate
neither that reward is the only function of dopamine sys-
tems nor that all reward functions involve dopamine neu-
rons.
Phasic dopamine activations not coding reward
Stimuli can induce alerting and attentional reactions
when they are physically important (physical salience) or
when they are related to reinforcers ('motivational' or
'affective' salience). Behavioral reactions to salient stimuli
are graded by the physical intensity of the stimuli and the
value of the reinforcer, respectively. Physical salience does
not depend on reinforcement at all, and motivational
salience do not depend on the valence of the reinforcers
(reward and punishment).
Responses to physically salient stimuli
Physically intense visual and auditory stimuli induce acti-
vations in dopamine neurons (Figure 1D). These
responses are enhanced by stimulus novelty [58-60] but
persist at a lower level for several months provided the
stimuli are sufficiently physically intense. The responses
are graded according to the size of the stimuli (Figure 4 in
[15]). Physical salience might also partly explain
responses to primary punishers with substantial physical
intensity [45]. These responses may constitute a separate
type of dopamine response related to the physical
salience of attention inducing environmental stimuli, or
they may be related to the positively motivating and rein-
forcing attributes of intense and novel stimuli.
The activations to physically salient stimuli do not seem
to reflect a general tendency of dopamine neurons to be
activated by any attention generating event. In particular,
other strong attention generating events such as reward
omission, conditioned inhibitors and aversive stimuli
induce predominantly depressions and rarely genuine
dopamine activations [14,29]. Thus the dopamine activa-
tion by physically salient stimuli may not constitute a
general alerting response. The reward response is likely
to constitute a separate response that may not reflect the
attention generated by the motivational salience of the
reward.
Other non-reward coding activations
Other stimuli induce activations in dopamine neurons
without apparent coding of reward value. These activa-
tions are smaller and shorter than the responses to
reward predicting stimuli and are often followed by
depression when the stimuli are unrewarded (Figure 1E).
Dopamine neurons show activations following control
stimuli that are presented in pseudorandom alternation
with rewarded stimuli [27,29,32]. The incidence of activa-
tions depends on the number of alternative, rewarded
stimuli in the behavioral task; activations are frequent
when three of four task stimuli are rewarded (25%-63%
[27]) and become rare when only one of four task stimuli
is unrewarded (1% [29]). This dependency argues against
a purely sensory nature of the response.
Dopamine neurons show a rather stereotyped initial
activation component to stimuli predicting rewards that
occur after different delays [43]. The initial activation var-
ies very little with reward delay, and thus does not seem
t o  c o d e  r e w a r d  v a l u e .  B y  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  s u b s e q u e n t
response component decreases with increasing delays
and thus codes (subjective) reward value (see above).
Dopamine neurons show frequent activations following
conditioned aversive stimuli presented in random alter-
nation with reward predicting stimuli; the activations dis-
appear largely when different sensory modalities are used
(65% vs. 11% of neurons [33]), suggesting coding of non-
aversive stimulus components. Even when aversive and
appetitive stimuli are separated into different trial blocks,
dopamine neurons are considerably activated by condi-
tioned aversive stimuli. However, the more frequent acti-
vations to the conditioned stimuli compared to the more
aversive primary air puff (37% vs. 11% [46]) suggests an
inverse relationship to the aversiveness of the stimuli and
possibly non-aversive response components.
The reasons for these different dopamine activations
might lie in generalization, pseudoconditioning or moti-
vational stimulus salience. Generalization arises from
similarities between stimuli. It might explain dopamine
activations in a number of situations, namely the activa-
tions to unrewarded visual stimuli when these alternate
with reward predicting visual stimuli (Figure 1E left)
[27,29,32] and the initial, poorly graded activation com-
ponent to reward delay predicting stimuli (Figure 1E
right) [43]. Generalization might play a role when stimuli
with different sensory modalities produce less dopamine
activations to unrewarded stimuli than stimuli with same
modalities, as seen with visual aversive and auditory
appetitive stimuli (Figure 1C bottom) [33].
Pseudoconditioning may arise when a primary rein-
forcer sets a contextual background and provokes unspe-
cific behavioral responses to any events within this
context [61]. As dopamine neurons are very sensitive to
reward, a rewarding context might induce pseudocondi-
tioning to stimuli set in this context and hence a neuronal
activation. This mechanism may underlie neuronal acti-
vations to non-rewarding stimuli occurring in a reward-
ing context, such as the laboratory in which an animalSchultz Behavioral and Brain Functions 2010, 6:24
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receives daily rewards, irrespective of the stimuli being
presented in random alternation with rewarded stimuli
or in separate trial blocks [46]. Pseudoconditioning may
explain activations to unrewarded control stimuli
[27,29,32], most activations following aversive stimuli
[33,45,46] and the initial, poorly graded activation com-
ponent to reward delay predicting stimuli [43]. Thus
pseudoconditioning may arise from the primary reward
rather than a conditioned stimulus and affect dopamine
activations to both conditioned stimuli and primary rein-
forcers that occur in a rewarding context.
Although stimuli with substantial physical salience
seem to drive dopamine neurons [15,58-60] (see above),
the stimuli that induce non-reward coding dopamine
activations are often small and not physically very salient.
Motivational salience is by definition common to rewards
and punishers and on its own might explain the activa-
tions to both reward and punishment in 10-20% of dop-
amine neurons. Non-reinforcing stimuli might become
motivationally salient through their proximity to reward
and punishment via pseudoconditioning. However, dop-
amine activations seem to be far more sensitive to reward
than punishment. As motivational salience involves sen-
sitivity to both reinforcers, motivational salience acquired
via pseudoconditioning might not explain well the non-
reward coding dopamine activations.
Taken together, many of the non-reward coding dop-
amine activations may be due to stimulus generalization
or, in particular, pseudoconditioning. Nevertheless, there
seem to remain true activations to unrewarded control
stimuli and to primary and conditioned aversive stimuli
in a limited proportion of dopamine neurons when these
factors are ruled out. Further experiments assessing such
responses should use better controls and completely
eliminate all contextual reward associations with stimuli
in the laboratory.
Given the occurrence of non-reward coding activa-
tions, it is reasonable to ask how an animal would distin-
guish rewarding from unrewarded stimuli based on a
dopamine response. The very rapid, initial, pseudocondi-
tioned and poorly discriminative response component
might provide a temporal bonus for faciliating fast,
default behavioural reactions that help the animal to very
quickly detect a potential reward [62]. By contrast, the
immediately following response component detects the
true nature of the event through its graded activation
with reward value [43] and its frequent depression with
unrewarded and aversive stimuli [27,29,32,33] (Figure
1E). Furthermore, the dopamine system is not the only
brain structure coding reward, and other neuronal sys-
tems such as the orbitofrontal cortex, striatum and
amygdala may provide additional discriminatory infor-
mation.
Dopamine reward risk signal
If a reward signal reflects the mean reward prediction
error scaled by the standard deviation of reward probabil-
ity distributions, and if we view standard deviation as a
measure of risk, could there be a direct neuronal signal
for risk? When reward probabilities vary from 0 to 1 and
the reward magnitude remains constant, the mean
reward value increases monotonically with probability,
whereas the amount of risk follows an inverted U func-
tion peaking at p = 0.5 (Figure 2, inset). At p = 0.5, there is
exactly as much chance to obtain a reward as there is to
miss a reward, whereas higher and lower probabilities
than p = 0.5 make gains and losses more certain, respec-
tively, and thus are associated with lower risk.
About one third of dopamine neurons show a relatively
slow, moderate, statistically significant activation that
increases gradually during the interval between the
reward predicting stimulus and the reward; this response
varies monotonically with risk (Figure 2) [18]. The activa-
tion occurs in individual trials and does not seem to con-
stitute a prediction error response propagating back from
reward to the reward predicting stimulus. The activation
increases monotonically also with standard deviation or
variance when binary distributions of different equiprob-
able, non-zero reward magnitudes are used. Thus, stan-
dard deviation or variance appear to be viable measures
for risk as coded by dopamine neurons. Risk related acti-
vations have longer latencies (about 1 s), slower time
courses and lower peaks compared to the reward value
responses to stimuli and reward.
Figure 2 Sustained activations related to risk. The risk response oc-
curs during the stimulus-reward interval (arrow) subsequently to the 
phasic, value related activation to the stimulus (triangle). The inset, top 
right, shows that risk (ordinate) varies according to an inverted U func-
tion of reward probability (abscissa) (Data from previous work [18].Schultz Behavioral and Brain Functions 2010, 6:24
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Due to its lower magnitude, the risk signal is likely to
induce lower dopamine release at dopamine varicosities
compared to the more phasic activations coding reward
value. The relatively low dopamine concentration possi-
bly induced by the risk signal might activate the D2
receptors which are mostly in a high affinity state but not
the low affinity D1 receptors [63]. By contrast, the higher
phasic reward value response might lead to more dop-
amine concentrations sufficient to briefly activate the D1
receptors in their mostly low affinity state. Thus the two
signals might be differentiated by postsynaptic neurons
on the basis of the different dopamine receptors acti-
vated. In addition, the dopamine value and risk signals
together would lead to almost simultaneous activation of
both D1 and D2 receptors which in many normal and
clinical situations is essential for adequate dopamine
dependent functions.
A dopamine risk signal may have several functions.
First, it could influence the scaling of the immediately fol-
lowing prediction error response by standard deviation
immediately after the reward [23]. Second, it could
enhance the dopamine release induced by the immedi-
ately following prediction error response. Since risk
induces attention, the enhancement of a potential teach-
ing signal by risk would be compatible with the role of
attention in learning according to the associability learn-
ing theories [64,65]. Third, it could provide an input to
brain structures involved in the assessment of reward risk
per se. Fourth, it could combine with an economic
expected value signal to represent considerable informa-
tion about the expected utility in risk sensitive individuals
according to the mean-variance approach in financial
decision theory [66]. However, the latency of about 1 s is
too long for the signal to play an instantaneous role in
choices under uncertainty.
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